. While fixing the scheme, we also improve its efficiency by reducing the ciphertext size to two elements compared to three in [4] .
Introduction
With the advent of mobile and portable devices such as cell phones and PDAs used in wireless networks, accessing multimedia content through these devices in the wireless network is becoming increasingly popular. On the other hand, a wireless network is much easier to eavesdrop than a wired network. Therefore, the need to securely deliver multimedia content to the user over a wireless network is becoming more important and critical. Furthermore, wireless communication is a good way to broadcast messages to many users in one go. In such applications, a central authority needs to deliver encrypted data to a large number of recipients in such a way that only a privileged subset of users can decrypt it. A broadcasting news channel may face this problem, for example, when a large number of people subscribe to a daily exclusive news feature. This is exactly the kind of problem that broadcast encryption attempts to efficiently solve. On top of this, especially in the current digital era, junk content or spam is a major turn off in almost every Internet application. If all the users who subscribe to the news feed receive meaningless noise or unwanted content, then the broadcaster is going to lose his subscribers. This results in the additional requirement that subscribers must have source authentication with respect to their broadcaster.
Broadcast signcryption, which enables the broadcaster to simultaneously encrypt and sign the content meant for a specific set of users in a single logical step, provides the most efficient solution to this dual problem of confidentiality and authentication. The efficiency of a broadcast signcryption scheme is mainly measured by three parameters -length of transmission messages, storage cost, and computational overhead at a user device. All these parame-ters are extremely important to mobile devices as they have limited memory and computational power as compared to a personal computer, and from the broadcaster's point of view, wireless bandwidth is an extremely costly resource. While several alternatives exist in implementing broadcast signcryption schemes, ID-based schemes are the best suited because of their unique advantage -any unique, publicly available parameter of a user can be his public key, which eliminates the need for a complex public key infrastructure.
Our Contribution. We give the general framework of an IBBSC scheme and define the formal security models for confidentiality and authentication for IBBSC (which we call IND-IBBSC-CCA2 and EUF-IBBSC-CMA respectively). In 2004, Bohio et al. [4] proposed an authenticated broadcasting scheme for wireless ad-hoc networks which is an IBBSC scheme, and claim that it provides message authentication and confidentiality though they prove neither property formally. In this paper, we demonstrate that any privileged user can forge the signcryption of any (possibly malicious) message as if the broadcaster signcrypted it. Moreover, we also show that their scheme is not IND-CCA secure (from the point of view of confidentiality). That is, during the IND-CCA game, when one of two messages of the adversary's choice is signcrypted and given back, he can easily find out which message was signcrypted. Following this, we propose an improvement to Bohio's IDbased broadcast signcryption (IBBSC) scheme to fix these security leaks, and formally prove its security (confidentiality and unforgeability) under the strongest existing security models for broadcast signcryption (IND-CCA2 and EUF-CMA respectively). We note that by fixing Bohio et al.'s IBBSC scheme, we do not hurt the efficiency of their scheme. In fact, we improve it by reducing the size of signcrypted ciphertext from three elements down to just two.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the underlying cryptographic concepts that are involved, like ID-based cryptography, signcryption, broadcast encryption, bilinear pairings and related computational problems, the general framework of ID-based broadcast signcryption (IBBSC) schemes and the formal security models for IBBSC. Next, in Section 3, we review the ID-based authenticated broadcast encryption scheme of Bohio et al. [4] . We present our attacks on this scheme in Section 4. Following this, in Section 5, we lay out the details of our improved IBBSC scheme, following the general framework of IBBSC schemes. We present the formal proofs of correctness, unforgeability and confidentiality of our improved scheme in Sections 6, 7 and 8 respectively. The proofs are presented in the strongest existing security models for IBBSC. In Section 9, we discuss the efficiency of our scheme. Finally, in Section 10, we conclude the discussion.
Preliminaries

Identity-based Cryptography
The concept of an Identity-based (ID-based) cryptosystem was introduced by Shamir in 1984 [26] . The distinguishing characteristic of ID-based cryptography is the ability to use any string as a public key. In particular, this string maybe the email address, telephone number, or any publicly available parameter of a user that is unique to him. The corresponding private key can only be derived by a trusted Private Key Generator (PKG) who keeps a master secret which is involved in deriving the private keys. Several early schemes that were proposed were unsatisfactory in different aspects. The first practical ID-based encryption (IBE) scheme was introduced by Boneh and Franklin in 2001 [8] . Since 2001, several schemes have been introduced [11, 27, 10, 7, 6, 5, 15] .
There are several advantages offered by ID-based cryptography. If there are only a finite number of users, after all users have been issued with keys, the master secret key can be destroyed, because in the basic ID-based cryptosystem, keys once issued are always valid. Also, as public keys are derived from identities, IBE eliminates the need for a public key distribution infrastructure (PKI). The authenticity of the public keys is guaranteed implicitly as long as the transport of the private keys to the corresponding user is kept secure.
Signcryption
To avoid forgery and ensure confidentiality of the contents of a letter, for centuries it has been a common practice for the sender of the letter to sign his name on it and then seal it in an envelope, before handing it over to a deliverer. Public key cryptography now makes it possible for people who have never met before to communicate with one another in a secure and authenticated way over an open and insecure network such as the Internet. In doing so, this same two-step approach has been followed. Namely, before a message is sent out, the sender of the message would sign it using a digital signature scheme, and then encrypt the message (and the signature) using a private key encryption algorithm under a randomly chosen message encryption key. The random message encryption key would then be encrypted using the recipient's public key. This traditional two-step approach is called signature-then-encryption.
Signature generation and encryption consume machine cycles, and also introduce 'expanded' bits to an original message. Symmetrically, a comparable amount of computation time is generally required for signature verification and decryption. Hence, the cost of a cryptographic operation on a message is typically measured in the message expansion rate and the computational time invested by both the sender and the recipient. With the standard signature-thenencryption approach, the cost for delivering a message in a secure and authenticated way is essentially the sum of the cost for digital signature and that for encryption.
In 1997 [29] , Yuliang Zheng presented these concerns and raised an important question as to whether it is possible to transfer a message of arbitrary length in a secure and authenticated way with an expense less than that required by the signature-then-encryption approach. Zheng answered his question by proposing signcryption which simultaneously fulfills both the functions of digital signature and public key encryption in a logically single step, and with a cost significantly smaller than that required by signature-thenencryption. He defines a signcryption scheme as consisting of a pair of (polynomial time) algorithms (S, U ), where S is called the signcryption algorithm and U is called the unsigncryption algorithm (also most commonly known as designcryption algorithm). S in general is probabilistic, while U is most likely to be deterministic. (S, U ) satisfy the following conditions.
1. Unique Unsigncryptability. Given a message m of arbitrary length, the algorithm S signcrypts m and outputs a signcrypted text c. On input c, the algorithm U unsigncrypts c and recovers the original message unambiguously.
2. Security. (S, U ) fulfill, simultaneously, the properties of a secure encryption scheme and those of a secure digital signature scheme. These properties mainly include confidentiality of message contents, unforgeability, and non-repudiation.
3. Efficiency. The computational cost, which includes the computational time involved both in signcryption and unsigncryption, and the communication overhead or added redundant bits, of the scheme is smaller than that required by the best currently known signaturethen-encryption scheme with comparable parameters.
Zheng's discovery went on to revolutionize the cryptographic research community and in a short span of a decade, signcryption has become an exploding research area. Since 1997, several efficient signcryption schemes have been proposed [2, 30, 14, 25, 22, 18, 28, 21] . The first example of formal security proof in a formal security model was published in 2002 [1] . However, none of these schemes were ID-based. Malone-Lee [20] proposed the first method that achieved ID-based signcryption. Libert and Quisquater [19] pointed out that [20] is not semantically secure because the signature of the message is visible in the signcrypted message. In [3] , Barreto et al. constructed the most efficient ID-based signcryption scheme to date.
Broadcast Encryption
Amos Fiat and Moni Naor, in 1993 [13] , analyzed the problem of a center broadcasting a message (e.g., a key to decipher a video clip) to a dynamically changing privileged subset of the users in such a way that non-members of the privileged class cannot learn the message, and proposed a solution which results in efficiency in both measurestransmission length and storage at the users end, without compromising the computational efficiency involved in carrying out the scheme. Their framework is called broadcast encryption. Apart from the normal security requirements of a two-party cryptosystem where there is one sender and one receiver, an additional property that is desired from any secure broadcast encryption scheme is collusion resistance. This means that even if all the non-privileged users collude in an attempt to learn the plaintext, they should not be able to do so.
Since its introduction by Fiat and Naor [13] , the problem received significant attention, and many of its variants have been studied; many broadcast encryption systems have been proposed [23, 17, 16, 9, 12] . The best known fully collusion resistant systems are the schemes of Boneh, Gentry and Waters [9] which achieve O( √ n)-size ciphertexts and public key; or, constant size ciphertexts, O(n)-size public key and constant size private keys.
Bilinear Pairing
Let G 1 be an additive cyclic group generated by P , with prime order q, and G 2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a mapê : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 with the following properties.
• Bilinearity. For all P, Q, R ∈ G 1 ,
, where I G2 is the identity element of G 2 .
• Computability. There exists an efficient algorithm to computeê(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G 1 .
Computational Assumptions
In this section, we review the computational assumptions related to bilinear maps that are relevant to the protocol we discuss.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP)
Definition. The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A in solving the BDH problem in G 1 is defined as
The BDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage Adv
is negligibly small.
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DB-DHP)
Definition. The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A in solving the DBDH problem in G 1 is defined as
The DBDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage Adv DBDH A is negligibly small.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP)
Definition. The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A in solving the CDH problem in G 1 is defined as
The CDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage Adv CDH A is negligibly small.
Inverse -Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
(Inverse -CDH)
Definition. The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A in solving the Inverse-CDH problem in G 1 is defined as
The Inverse-CDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage Adv
Framework of ID-based Broadcast Signcryption (IBBSC)
We describe below, the framework for IBBSC that we use to describe Bohio et al.'s scheme and our fix. It is not a general framework but a tailored one to fit the present context and purpose. It consists of the following probabilistic polynomial time algorithms.
Setup(k). Given a security parameter k, the Private
Key Generator (PKG) generates the public parameters params and master secret key msk of the system.
Keygen(ID A ).
Given an identity ID A , the PKG, using the public parameters params and the master secret key msk, computes the corresponding private key S A and transmits it to A in a secure way.
Signcrypt(m, ID A ,Ŝ A ).
To send a message m to legal users, the broadcaster A with identity ID A and secret valueŜ A runs this algorithm to obtain the signcrypted ciphertext σ.
Designcrypt(σ,Ŝ A ).
A user who has the common secret valueŜ A , on receiving the signcrypted ciphertext σ from broadcaster A, runs this algorithm to obtain either the plain text m or ⊥ according as whether σ was a valid signcryption by A or not.
Security Model for ID-based Broadcast Signcryption
The two security properties that are desired out of any IBBSC scheme are message confidentiality and unforgeability. We formally extend the existing strongest security notions for encryption and digital signatures (IND-CCA2 and EUF-CMA respectively) to IBBSC below (keeping the framework that we discussed in the previous section in mind).
Indistinguishability under Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack for IBBSC (IND-IBBSC-CCA2)
An ID-based broadcast signcryption scheme is semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-IBBSC-CCA2) if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
1. The challenger C runs Setup(k) and sends the system public parameters params to the adversary A.
2.
A makes polynomially bounded number of queries to the following oracles. The advantage of the adversary in winning this game is defined as
We mention that this model of security takes into account collusion resistance too, because we provide the adversary with the secret keys of every user of the system except the ones he attacks.
Existential Unforgeability under Adaptive Chosen Message Attack for IBBSC (EUF-IBBSC-CMA)
An ID-based broadcast signcryption scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack (EUF-IBBSC-CMA) if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
2. This step is identical to that in the indistinguishability game of the previous section. 
We mention that this model of security takes into account collusion resistance too, because we allow the adversary to query for the secret keys of any entity.
Overview of IBBSC Scheme of Bohio et al.
Bohio et al.'s IBBSC scheme [4] is an unconventional scheme, in the following sense. Neither does the signcryption involve the secret key of the broadcaster, nor does the designcryption involve the secret key of the receiver. Both signcryption and designcryption involve some other common secret, which is established beforehand using the secret keys. Once this common secret (called the broadcast parameter below) is established, the secret keys are not used at all. But this has the advantage of providing constant ciphertext size. The scheme consists of the three algorithms INITIAL-IZE (which includes Setup and Keygen), SIGNCRYPT and DESIGNCRYPT, which we describe below.
INITIALIZE -The steps in the setup phase are given below.
1. The security parameter of the scheme is k. The trusted authority chooses two groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q where |q| = k, a generator P of G 1 , a bilinear mapê : 3. The public key of a user i with identity ID i is Q i = H 1 (ID i ) and the corresponding private key is S i = sQ i .
4. The steps followed by broadcaster B are as follows.
(a) Store a precomputed value ω B =ê (Q B , P ) to be used during signcryption.
(b) Select randomly a value x B ∈ Z * q to be the broadcast secret and compute the broadcast parameter as x B Q B . When a subscriber (user) i joins the broadcaster, send the broadcast parameter, encrypted with the key H 0 (ê (S B , Q i )) using the one time pad. The user can compute the key as H 0 (ê (S i , Q B )) and recover the broadcast parameter. Note that no secure channel need be used during user joining.
SIGNCRYPT -In order to signcrypt a message m, the broadcaster B will do the following. 
Compute h = H 3 (m).
Choose r ∈
Broadcast (c, U, V ) to all the users.
DESIGNCRYPT -For the designcryption of the message, the authorized receivers (those provided with the broadcast parameter x B Q B ) will do the following. 
2. The message m is then decrypted as m = c ⊕ d .
The authentication is provided by computing h = H 3 (m) and verifying whetherê (Q B , U + h P )
?
= ω .
Attacks on IBBSC Scheme of Bohio et al.
Bohio et al. claimed that their scheme provides both confidentiality and unforgeability (authentication), but they do not give any formal proof to support their claims. We show in this section the following two attacks.
Attack on Authentication
Here, we demonstrate that their scheme is universally forgeable -any legitimate user can generate a valid ciphertext for any message m * as if it were generated by the broadcaster. For a ciphertext to be valid, it should satisfŷ e (Q B , U + h P ) = ω where ω is obtained using V . Also, the message hash h and U are independent, and hence it is easy to play with the parameters to mount a forgeability attack. We describe how this attack proceeds in this section.
To forge the ciphertext of B on a message m * of his choice, a legitimate user simply does the following.
Compute the hash of the message
2. Choose a value r * ∈ R Z * q and compute the following. The DESIGNCRYPT algorithm will do the following.
1. The key computation would proceed as follows.
(a) The quantity ω would be computed as
2. The message m is then decrypted as m = c * ⊕ d .
The authentication is provided by computing h = H 3 (m ) and verifying whetherê (Q B , U
From this, it is clear that a malicious user can forge the signcryption of his broadcaster on any message of his choice.
Attack on Confidentiality
Here, we demonstrate that Bohio et al.'s scheme is not IND-CCA secure. Specifically, in the IND-CCA game, during the challenge phase, when the adversary gives two messages m 0 and m 1 of his choice to the challenger and the challenger randomly signcrypts one of them and returns it, the adversary can find out whether the challenge ciphertext is that of m 0 or m 1 . For an adversary to distinguish which message was encrypted, it is enough if he can find out which symmetric key was used for encryption. Since ω can be computed easily asê(Q B , U + hP ) where h is either H 3 (m 0 ) or H 3 (m 1 ). The attack proceeds as follows.
On receiving the challenge signcrypted ciphertext (c, U, V ), the adversary does the following. The adversary is sure to succeed, because of the inherent construction of the scheme -the verification method reveals the key used for encrypting the message. Hence the scheme is not IND-CCA secure.
Our Fix for Bohio et al.'s Scheme
We now describe the fix for Bohio's scheme. The INI-TIALIZE algorithm is the same as that of Bohio et al.'s (described in Section 3) except for a modification in the hash functions H 2 and H 3 as follows.
The SIGNCRYPT and DESIGNCRYPT algorithms are described below.
SIGNCRYPT -In order to signcrypt a message m, broadcaster B will do the following.
1. Choose r ∈ R Z * q and compute U = rP .
Compute h = H 3 (m, U ).
Compute the session key as
6. Broadcast (c, V ) to all the users.
DESIGNCRYPT -For the designcryption of the message, the authorized receivers (those provided with the broadcast parameter x B Q B ) will do the following.
1. Compute the key d by performing the following computations.
(a) Compute the quantity ω as 
Correctness of our IBBSC Scheme
In this section, we proceed to prove that our proposed scheme is indeed consistent and correct. If σ = (c, V ) is a valid signcrypted ciphertext from broadcaster B to his privileged subscribers then the DESIGNCRYPT algorithm will do the following.
Compute the quantity ω as
ω =ê (x B Q B , V ) =ê x B Q B , x −1 B (r + h)P =ê (Q B , P ) (r+h) 2. Compute d = H 2 (ω ).
Retrieve the message m from m U by decrypting
= ω , succeeds because, 2 , and L 3 = m, U, h 3 . The reasons for and meanings of the elements of these lists will become clear during the discussion of the corresponding oracles. We assume that A will ask for H 1 (ID) before ID is used in any key extraction, signcryption and designcryption queries. First, the adversary A outputs the identity of the broadcaster whose signcryption he claims to forge. Without loss of generality, let it be ID B . The challenger C gives A the system parameters G 1 , G 2 ,ê, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , where P pub = sP for some s ∈ R Z * q . The broadcaster secret x B Q B is set as aQ B 2 . During the query stage, A can query the following oracles.
Proof of Unforgeability of our IBBSC Scheme
L 1 = ID, x ID , S ID , Q ID , L 2 = ω, h
Oracle O H1 (ID). C checks if there exists a tuple
If such a tuple exists, C answers with Q ID . Otherwise, C does the following. 1 x B Q B is given as part of the private information on using KeyExtract oracle. So there is no need for seperate oracle for H 0 . x B Q B is known to all legal users subscribed to broadcaster ID B , hence it is also given to A 2 Note that Q B = x ID B P . Therefore aQ B can be computed as Oracle O Signcrypt (m, ID B ). On receiving this query, C checks if there is an entry for ID B in L 1 not, then C aborts. Otherwise, C retrieves the tuple
randomly and does the following.
4. Set V = rP .
Broadcast the signcrypted ciphertext σ = (c, V ).
Oracle O Designcrypt (σ). On receiving the signcryption σ = (c, V ), C executes the DESIGNCRYPT algorithm on σ in the normal way and returns what the designcryption algorithm returns.
Eventually A outputs a forged signcryption σ * = (y * , V * ) on some message m * from the broadcaster B to his subscribers. Challenger C executes the DESIGNCRYPT algorithm on σ * . If σ * is a valid signcryption from the broadcaster B to his subscribers, i.e., a message m * is returned by the decryption algorithm, then C applies the oracle replay technique 3 to produce two valid signcryptions σ = (c , V ) and σ = (c , V ) on some arbitrary message m from the broadcaster B to all his subscribers. Now we can apply standard arguments for the outputs of the forking lemma since both V and V are valid signatures for the same message m and same random tape of the adversary. Finally, C obtains the solution to the Inverse-CDH instance as
. 4 We have, 
and L s = σ, m . The reasons for and meanings of the elements of these lists will become clear during the discussion of the corresponding oracles. We assume that A will ask for H 1 (ID) before ID is used in any key extraction, signcryption and designcryption queries. First, the adversary A outputs the identity of the broadcaster whose subscribers he plans to attack. Without loss of generality, let it be ID B . The challenger C gives A the system param- 
Oracle O Designcrypt (σ). Note that the challenger does not know the broadcast parameter x B Q B = abP and hence cannot do a normal designcryption. So, he does the following (assume σ = (c, V )). C returns σ = y, V as the challenge signcrypted ciphertext.
A is now allowed to perform at most q s queries (which may include queries to any of the oracles) as above. However, it cannot query the designcryption oracle with the challenge signcryption. Finally the adversary outputs the guess b of the bit b. If the adversary has to win the game with non-negligible advantage, then he must have decrypted the challenge signcrypted ciphertext for which, he should have queried O H2 withê(x B Q B , V ) which is nothing but e(abP, (c + h 3 )P ) =ê(P, P ) abc+abh3 . Since L 2 records the queries of the adversary to O H2 in the form of ω, h 2 , within q s queries, we can decide if α ? =ê(P, P ) abc by checking if ω = α ·ê(aP, h 3 bP ) every time the adversary queries O H2 . The challenger aborts the adversary as soon as the DBDH problem is solved.
So, if there exists a non-trivial adversary who can defeat the signcryption by learning something about the encrypted message, that means there exists an algorithm to solve the DBDH problem with non-negligible advantage. Since this is not possible, no adversary can defeat the signcryption this way. Hence, our proposed scheme is secure against any IND-IBBSC-CCA2 attack.
Efficiency of our IBBSC Scheme
In this section, we discuss the efficiency of our improved IBBSC scheme. The major parameters involved are the computation costs for signcryption and designcryption operations, the communication cost and the storage at the user's end. For computational cost, we consider the number of pairing computations performed, as they are the costliest operations involved. Our improved IBBSC scheme performs no pairing operation during Signcrypt (except during setup of ω B ) and two pairing operations per user for Designcrypt, which is the same as that of Bohio et al.'s scheme. For the communication cost, we have to broadcast only a tuple of two elements compared to three in Bohio et al.'s scheme. Coming to storage cost, we consider the storage at the broadcaster's end and storage at the user's end. The storage cost for the broadcaster and a user is only O(1) as they do not have to store anything other than their secret key and precomputed secret. Thus, our improved scheme does not compromise any of the efficiency properties of Bohio et al.'s scheme. The added advantage here is that the size of signcrypted ciphertext has been reduced to two elements.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the problem of secure and authenticated content distribution over large networks, especially wireless networks, which, on one hand, are increasingly becoming popular choices for the modern civilization, what with the advent of mobile and portable devices such as cell phones and PDAs, and on the other hand, are much easier to eavesdrop than wired networks. IBBSC schemes provide the best solution to this problem. First, we have demonstrated a break of Bohio et al.'s IBBSC scheme, both in terms of authentication and confidentiality. Following this, we have proposed a fixed version of the scheme to prevent forgeability and we have also proven its IND-CCA2 and EUF-CMA security formally in the random oracle model. These are the strongest security notions for message confidentiality and authentication respectively. While we have fixed Bohio et al.'s IBBSC scheme, we have not compromised the performance of their scheme. In fact, we reduce the size of the signcrypted ciphertext to two elements.
Future Work. While Bohio et al.'s scheme (and hence our fixed version) offers the indisputable advantage of constant size ciphertext, it suffers from a major drawback. Suppose a user is to be revoked or a user leaves the group. Then the whole scheme comes to a standstill. Because now the broadcast parameter has to be changed and sent to every remaining user of the group. So, it becomes important for the research community to investigate for conventional IBBSC schemes that also achieve constant size ciphertexts.
